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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Notice of Appeal does designate "all preceding or interim orders" 
giving notice that the court's ruling on summary judgment is being appealed. Further, 
any interim order, involving the merits, can be challenged on appeal without being 
specifically designated in the notice of appeal. Speros v. Fricke, 98 P.3d 28 (Utah 2004). 
There are numerous issues of fact in this case regarding the denial of 
Plaintiffs insurance claim based on arson, and the Insurance Company's failure to 
investigate the facts. When an insured's claim is denied based on arson and issues of fact 
are present, the question as to whether the denial was "fairly debatable" at the time, or in 
"good faith," is for the jury to determine. Horrell v. Utah Farm Bureau Inc. Co., 909 
P.2d 1279 (Ut.App. 1996). 
Insurance policies are contracts for the payment of money when an 
unexpected loss occurs, therefore Utah courts have held that the issuance of an insurance 
policy for the loss, and the receipt of premiums on the policy, establishes the prima facie 
liability of the insurance company. Fox v. Allstate Insurance Co., 453 P.2d 701, 706 
(Utah 1969); Peterson v. Western Casualty and Surety Co., 425 P.2d 769 (Utah 1976). 
Insurance policies are contracts of adhesion and should be construed against 
the insurance company, allowing coverage in the broadest sense possible. When 
exceptions are contained in an insurance policy, the presumption is that that which is not 
clearly excluded, is included. LDS Hospital, Division of Intermountain Healthcare, Inc. 
1 
v. Capitol Life Ins. Co,, 765 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1988). 
The determination as to whether a fire is "accidental" under an insurance 
policy is not dependent on expert testimony regarding the cause of the fire, but rather 
whether from the insured's point of view, the fire was foreseeable as a natural and 
probable result of the insured*s own actions. Hoffman v. Life Ins, Co, of North America, 
669 P.2d 410 (Utah 1983); Fire Insurance Exchange v. Rosenberg, 930 P.2d 1202, 1206 
(Ut.App. 1997). Therefore, expert testimony was not necessary in this case, to put on 
evidence that the fire was "accidental" for coverage under the insurance policy. 
Furthermore, when the cause and origin of a fire is at issue in a case, a party 
is not required to put on expert testimony, in order to present an issue of fact for the jury 
to determine whether or not the fire was accidental. Bear River Mutual Ins. Co. v. 
Williams, 2006 P.3d (2006 Ut. App. 500). Failure to use an expert to establish causation 
does not result in a directed verdict. Neely v. Bennett, 51 P.3d 724 (Ut.App. 2002). 
Plaintiffs expert was properly designated as a witness for Plaintiffs case, 
and not merely as a rebuttal witness. Plaintiffs intent to use the witness in rebuttal, does 
not preclude her from calling him on her case. The two are not mutually exclusive. The 
court was aware that Plaintiff intended to call her expert before resting her case; and told 
Plaintiff that her expert could testify on her case at noon the following day. The court 
abused its discretion in not allowing Plaintiffs expert to testify the next day, and ruling 
on Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict before the close of Plaintiff s case. 
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On a motion for directed verdict the moving party has the very difficult 
burden of showing that the party with the burden of proof has failed to raise any questions 
of material fact; and the court should deny the motion, when any evidence exists raising 
such a question, no matter how improbable the evidence may appear. A Ita Health 
Strategies, Inc., v. CCIMechanical Serv., 930 P.2d 284 (Ut.App. 1996). The Plaintiff 
through her testimony, the testimony of her witnesses, as well as, the cross examination of 
Defendant's witnesses, and admitted exhibits, presented evidence raising questions of 
material fact, as to whether the fire was "accidental" under her insurance policy. 
The court improperly dismissed Plaintiffs case in the middle of a jury trial 
relying on Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The court did not just 
erroneously refer to Rule 41(b), but weighing the evidence, determined it was insufficient 
without expert testimony, to establish the fire was "accidental" under the insurance 
policy. The Defendant tried to change this reference in its preparation of the Judgment; 
however, it is the substance of a motion that is dispositive in determining its character. 
Adoption of Baby K, 967 P.2d 947, 948 n. 1 (Ut.App. 1998). It was improper for the trial 
judge to dismiss the jury trial based on the weight of the evidence under Rule 41(b). 
I. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL IS SUFFICIENT TO APPEAL 
THE COURT'S PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT RULING. 
The Notice of Appeal in this case references the Judgment on Directed 
Verdict, entered on December 7, 2006, as well as, "allpreceding or interim orders." 
(Rec. 1296). Therefore, the Notice of Appeal is sufficient in this case and gives the 
3 
Defendant notice that all preceding or interim orders, including the ruling on partial 
summary judgment, are being appealed. 
The notice of appeal in Jensen v. Intermountain Power Agency, 977 P.2d 
474 (Utah 1999), is distinguishable from the Notice of Appeal in this case. In Jensen the 
notice of appeal was only from the jury verdict entered on July 14, 1995 and the denial of 
certain post-judgment motions. Jensen failed to indicate in his notice, that he was 
appealing any other orders entered by the court. Moreover the jury verdict entered in the 
Jensen case dealt with a totally separate issue than the earlier summary judgment motion, 
which involved other third-party defendants.1 The Court in Jensen was concerned that 
the notice of appeal from the jury's verdict, which involved separate issues, failed to give 
adequate notice to Intermountain that there was also an appeal from the earlier summary 
judgment ruling; and as a result, Intermountain did not proceed with cross appeals against 
the third-party defendants involved, but dismissed years earlier by the court on summary 
judgment. Id. at 446. 
The Notice of Appeal in this case however, clearly indicates that an appeal 
is being taken, not only from the Judgment on Directed Verdict entered on December 21, 
2006, but from "allpreceding and interim orders^ (Rec. 1296). This would include the 
court's ruling on the partial summary judgment, dismissing a portion of Plaintiff s claims. 
1
 The summary judgment in Jensen dealt with Jensen's storage easements and 
water rights, and included cross-claims against third-party defendants; while the jury trial 
dealt solely with flooding issues against Intermountain Power Agency. 
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Furthermore, after Jensen v. Intermountain, in Speros v. Fricke, 98 P.3d 28 
(Utah 2004), the Utah Supreme Court stated that Rule 3(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure does not require an appellant to indicate that the appeal also concerns 
intermediate orders or events that have led to the final judgment. Id., citing Zion 's First 
National Bank v. Rocky Mountain Irr. Inc., 931 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1977); Scudderv. 
Kennecott Copper Inc., 886 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1994). 
In addition, the Utah Supreme Court in Speros v. Fricke, limited the holding 
in Jensen v. Intermountain, to the fact that the appellee was unjustly prejudiced by the 
appellant's failure to designated earlier matters decided on summary judgment, because it 
deprived the appellee of the opportunity, "to proceed with cross-appeals against the third-
party defendants involved, whom the court dismissed years earlier by granting summary 
judgment." Speros v. Fricke, supra, footnote 2.2 
The Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that a party seeking to appeal a 
non-final summary judgment decision does not need to specifically identify that summary 
judgment ruling in its notice of appeal. Id. See U.P.C. Inc. v. R.O.A. General Inc., 990 
P.2d 945. 951 (Utah 1999)(because U.P.C. Inc., "generally designated the final judgment 
in its notice of appeal, [it is] not precluded from alleging errors in any intermediate order 
2The Court in Speros found that even if the appellant failed to accurately designate 
the dates of the orders appealed, Nationwide did not, and cannot argue that it suffered any 
such prejudice. Likewise, in this case, the Defendant cannot argue any such prejudice; 
and has in fact responded to the appeal of the partial summary judgment ruling. 
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involving the merits or necessarily affecting the judgment." Id. at 952, citing Zions First 
National Bank, 931 P.2d 142, at 144 (Utah 1997). To hold otherwise would be unduly 
harsh, does not further the underlying purpose of a notice of appeal and would be a direct 
contradiction of our jurisprudence governing the right of appeal. Statutes giving the right 
of appeal are to be liberally construed in the furtherance of justice. An interpretation that 
will work as a forfeiture of that right, is not favored. Id at 952. 
The Notice of Appeal in this case clearly designates "allpreceding and 
interim orders" and the summary judgment ruling is an intermediate order involving the 
merits of the case and affecting the final judgment reached. Therefore, the Defendant 
received adequate notice that the ruling on partial summary judgment was being appealed; 
and the Notice of Appeal is sufficient to convey jurisdiction to this Court. 
II. THE BAD FAITH CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN LEFT FOR 
THE JURY; NOT DISMISSED ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The determination as to whether there is a "fairly debatable" defense under 
the facts and circumstances is usually a question of law. Billings v. Union Bankers Inc. 
Co., 918 P.2d 461, 464 (Utah 1996). However, when there are factual questions as to the 
insurance company's good faith investigation into the facts, the matter should be left for 
the jury to decide. Billings v. Union Bankers Inc. Co., 918 P.2d 461,466 (Utah 1996). In 
the case of Horrell v. Utah Farm Bureau Inc. Co., 909 P.2d 1279 (Ut.App. 1996), where 
the insured's claim was denied based on arson and misrepresentation, as in this case, the 
question as to whether the denial of the insurance claim was "fairly debatable" at the time 
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or not, was a question of fact, for the jury to decide. Id. at 1282. 
In this case there were numerous factual questions presented on the motions 
for summary judgment (Rec. 422-508), regarding the actions of the Insurance Company, 
its investigation, and its denial based on arson.3 
For example, the insurance investigator, Mr. Bebee testified he thought the 
fire was intentionally set because no one was home at the time; however, he did not talk 
to the boys who were in the home that night. (Rec. 1304, p. 101). The Plaintiff never 
told him she was at the home late at night or early in the morning on July 26th, the day of 
the fire. She told him that she was there late at night on the 24th of July; and had spent the 
day before the fire, July 25th in Salt Lake City. (Rec. 1304, p. 35-36). There were no 
eyewitnesses claiming Leigh was at the home the night of the fire. The written statement 
from Steve Johnson (admitted into evidence as Ex. 25), does not say that he saw Leigh or 
Doug there, only a Ford Ranger. (Rec. 1150-1151, Trial Ex. 25). If Mr. Bebee would 
have talked to the boys, he would have learned that Chad Smith, who also drove a Ford 
Ranger, was at the house that night and early the next morning, with Tim and his friends. 
(Rec. 1305, p. 152). Mr. Bebee did not fully investigate these facts. 
3See Nature of Proceedings and Statement of Facts in Appellant's opening brief. 
Defendant in footnotes argues that Points I, VI, VII and VIII should be stricken for failure 
to cite to the record under Rule 24(a)(9) U.R.App.P. However, Plaintiff did cite to the 
record in her brief, in the Statement of the Case, Nature of Proceedings, Statement of 
Facts, and referred to them in her Argument when appropriate without restating all the 
facts. If strict compliance of the rules are enforced, Appellee's footnotes should be 
stricken, because they are not 13-point or larger, as required by Rule 27(b). 
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Sandy Fire Marshall Richard Lyman was also made aware that the boys 
were in the home the night of the fire, but he did not bother to talk to them in preparing 
his report. (Rec. 1305, p. 231). His report, upon which the Insurance Company relied, 
states that it could change upon further information. (Rec. 1305, p. 232). Mr. Lyman 
said that the boys being there that night could change his opinion in his report. (Rec. 
1305, p. 232) When questioned about how this would change his opinion at trial, the 
court would not allow, Plaintiffs counsel to proceed with such questions. (Rec. 1305, p. 
236). Mr. Lyman indicated that there was no source of ignition in the middle of the room 
and then states in the same report that the accelerant dog hit on an object in the middle of 
the room. (Rec. 1305, p. 228). If he would have talked to the boys he would have learned 
that they were there that night and had numerous appliances in the middle of the room, 
including a T.V., a VCR, video game, and even had a candle lit, all on a pine table located 
in the middle of the room. (Rec. 1305, p. 150-151). Mr. Lyman also testified that it was 
a flashover fire and could have started in a mattress located in the room. (Rec. 1305, p. 
224). If Mr. Lyman would have talked to the boys, he would have learned that they were 
there drinking, lighting candles, and smoking on the mattresses. (Rec. 1305, p. 137). 
John Blundell the insurance investigator (deceased before trial) did not talk 
to the boys that were there that night. (Rec. 1305, p. 155). The statements he made in his 
report are hearsay, and were objected to and inadmissible, for purposes of summary 
judgment. (Rec. 523, fs j , k & 1). Detective Berhow did not talk to the boys and did not 
testify at trial The statements made by Detective Berhow regarding what Richard Ricci or 
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John Remington may have said are hearsay, and were objected to and inadmissible for 
purposes of summary judgment. (Rec. 523, fs j , k & 1). 
There was no direct evidence that the fire was started or arranged by the 
Plaintiff, for the Insurance Company to deny coverage based on its arson exclusion. (Rec. 
1305, p. 222). A jury could find that the denial based on arson constituted bad faith.4 
This matter should not have been dismissed on summary judgment, but left for the jury to 
decide. Horrell v. Utah Farm Bureau Inc. Co., 909 P.2d 1279 (Ut.App. 1996). 
III. PLAINTIFF ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE 
OF LIABILITY AGAINST THE INSURANCE COMPANY. 
The elements of a prima facie case for breach of contract are (1) a contract, 
(2) performance, (3) breach of contract by the other party and (4) damages. Breach of 
contract damages seek to place the party in the same economic position the party would 
have been in, if the contract had not been breached. Bair v. Axiom Design L.L. C, 20 P.3d 
388 (Utah 2001). 
In this case, Plaintiff established that there was a contract (insurance 
policy); there was performance by the Plaintiff (paying premiums and submitting claims); 
there was a breach by the Insurance Company (denying her claims); and damages, (the 
payment she should have received under the policy). Therefore, Plaintiff did establish a 
prima facie case for breach of her insurance contract. Id. 
4The Insurance Company did not deny the claim because it wasn't an "accident" 
under the policy, but relied on its exclusions for arson and fraud. (Rec. 1304; Ex. 16). 
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Since insurance policies are contracts for the payment of money for an 
unexpected loss, Utah courts have held that the issuance of an insurance policy for the 
loss, and the receipt of premiums on the policy, establishes the, prima facie liability of the 
insurance company. Fox v. Allstate Insurance Co., 453 P.2d 701, 706 (Utah 1969); 
Peterson v. Western Casualty and Surety Co., 425 P.2d 769 (Utah 1976). 
The case of Fox v. Allstate Insurance Co. is on point in this case, as the 
insured filed a claim for the loss of his boat. The insured claimed that the boat struck a 
submerged object in Utah Lake and sank. The insurance company did a search of the 
entire area, but found no signs of the sunken craft. The court found that the insured had 
met his prima facie case against the insurance company, by the issuance of the insurance 
policy and the payment of premiums. Id at 706. The insured was not required to produce 
expert testimony regarding the loss of his boat; and the question as to whether he even 
owned a boat or lost it at all, was left for the jury's determination. A motion for a 
directed verdict could not be properly granted. Id at 704. 
The Plaintiff in this case, therefore, did establish & prima facie case of 
liability against the Insurance Company (without expert testimony), through her testimony 
and the Insurance Company's admission that the policy was purchased, the premiums 
paid, and the policy was in effect on the day of the fire.5 (Rec. 1304, p.23). Id. at 706. 
5Defendant complains that this shouldn't automatically entitled the insured to 
payment under the policy. However, it doesn't. It only establishes the prima facie 
liability of the insurance company. The insurance company still has all of its exclusions 
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IV. THE PLAINTIFF DID PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT THE 
FIRE WAS "ACCIDENTAL" FOR COVERAGE UNDER 
HER INSURANCE POLICY. 
The trial court granted Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict, stating 
that there was no evidence presented by Plaintiffs expert that the fire was "accidental". 
The trial court made this statement without attempting to define what constitutes 
"accidental" under an insurance contract. The Policy at issue in this case provides, "[w]e 
insure for accidental direct physical loss to property described in Coverage C, but only if 
caused by one or more of the following perils: 1. Fire or lightning " (Rec. 220). 
There is no definition of the term "accidental" in the Policy. 
Although the courts construe insurance contracts using the same 
interpretive tools used to review contracts generally, they have frequently declared that 
because insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion, they are to be "construed liberally 
in favor of the insured and their beneficiaries, so as to promote and not defeat, the 
purposes of insurance." U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519 (Utah 1993). 
Liberal construction should be given in favor of the insured to accomplish the purpose for 
which the insurance was obtained and for which the premium was paid. Id. at 522. The 
insured is entitled to the broadest coverage or protection that he could reasonably believe 
was afforded under the policy.6 Id. at 522. If an insurance contract has inconsistent 
and other defenses that can still be raised. 
6It is not a reasonable belief, that an insured would be required to hire an expert to 
prove the cause and origin of a fire before establishing a prima facie case for liability on 
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provisions, one which can be construed against coverage and one which can be construed 
in favor of coverage, the contract should be construed in favor of coverage.7 Id. at 523. 
Furthermore, where exceptions are introduced into an insurance contract, a 
general presumption arises to the effect that that which is not clearly excluded from the 
operation of such contract is included in the operation thereof.8 IDS Hospital, Division of 
Intermountain Healthcare, Inc. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1988). 
In Richards v. Standard Accident Insurance Co., 200 P. 1017 (Utah 1921) 
the Utah Supreme Court first laid down the standard for defining the words "accident" or 
"accidental" as used in an insurance policy, stating "the word is descriptive of means 
which produce effects, which are not their natural and probable consequences." Id. at 
1023. The Court also defined the phrase "natural and probable consequence," stating: 
The natural and probable consequence of means used [is] the consequence which 
ordinarily follows from their use - the result which may be reasonably anticipated 
from their use, and which ought to be expected. Id. 
his insurance policy. 
7The trial court's definition of "accidental" in this case, is even more restrictive 
than the exclusion for arson, as the arson exclusion only applies if it is the insured who 
intentionally sets or arranges for the fire. (Rec. 1304). In other words, if someone other 
than the insured intentionally sets fire to the home, the insured may still be able to recover 
despite the arson exclusion, Error v. Western Home Ins. Co., 762 P.2d 1077, 1081 (Utah 
1988); but that person would never be able to recover, because he would be unable to 
establish that the fire was "accidental" under the general terms of the policy. 
8Given the trial court's definition of "accidental" an insurance company will never 
again have the burden of proving arson as an affirmative defense, as the insured will be 
required to prove the fire was "accidental" under the general terms of the policy. 
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The Utah Supreme Court applied this definition in Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. 
of North America, 669 P.2d 410 (Utah 1983), stating: "thus, a person is a victim of an 
accident, when from the victim's point of view, the occurrence causing the injury or 
death is not a natural and probable result of the victim's own acts." (emphasis added) 
Id. at 416.9 This is consistent with the accepted definition of "accidental" as used in 
insurance contracts. Black's Law Dictionary, 7th Edition (Qualification of a particular 
incident as an "accident" depends on two criteria: (1) The degree of foreseeabihty; and 
(2) the state of mind of the actor in intending or not intending the result). 
Therefore, the question as to whether the fire was "accidental" under the 
insurance policy in this case, is not dependent on an expert testifying as to the cause or 
origin of the fire; but rather, whether from the Plaintiffs point of view, the fire was 
foreseeable as the natural and probable result of the Plaintiffs own actions . Hoffman v. 
Life Ins. Co. of North America, 669 P.2d 410 (Utah 1983); Fire Insurance Exchange v. 
Rosenberg, 930 P.2d 1202, 1206 (Ut.App. 1997).10 
9Hoffman had been suicidal and was armed when shot by police. The trial court 
ruled that his death was not accidental as a matter of law The Utah Supreme Court 
however reversed and remanded the case back to the trial court to determine whether his 
death was intended or an accident, based on Hoffman's state of mind. Id. at 420-421. 
10In Fire Insurance Exchange v. Rosenberg, 930 P.2d 1202, (Ut.App. 1997) the 
Utah Court of Appeals indicated that an "accident" under an insurance policy may still 
occur even if the injury is the result of an insured's deliberate or intentional act, if the 
actual result is beyond the scope of anticipated injury. For instance, the scope of 
anticipated injury is significantly greater when firing a shotgun or throwing a cherry 
bomb, than throwing a water balloon. Id. at 1206. 
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In this case, the Plaintiff testified that she was not home at the time the fire 
started, and that she had not been home the day before the fire started. (Rec. 1304, p. 34-
36). She stated that the last time she was at home before the fire, everything appeared to 
be normal. (Rec. 1304, p. 25). She learned of the fire while at the Travelodge in Salt 
Lake City, and it came as a total surprise. (Rec. 1304, p. 35-37). She did not know how 
the fire started and asked how the fire started. (Rec. 1304, p. 38). Furthermore, she 
contacted her insurance company and filed proof of claims for her damages. (Rec. 1304, 
p. 41-43). According to her testimony, in her view the fire was accidental and she treated 
the fire as accidental. She did not do anything from which the fire could have started as a 
natural and probable result.11 Therefore, the Plaintiff (without expert testimony) did 
present evidence that the fire was "accidental" under her insurance policy. 
The case of Metric Const Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 
2005 WL 21000939, (D. Utah 2005) is an unpublished decision, FOR EDUCATIONAL 
USE ONLY, and thus has no precedential value and should not be used, except for the 
purpose of applying the doctrine of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.12 
Regardless, the decision in Metric Const Co., supports Plaintiffs position that the 
1
 defendant argues that the Plaintiff never testified specifically that she didn't start 
the fire, however, this is a reasonable inference from her actions and testimony; and on 
Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict all inferences are to be viewed in Plaintiffs 
favor. The question is whether any evidence was presented to the jury, no matter how 
improbable. Alta Health Strategies, Inc. v. CCIMechanical Service, supra. 
nState v. Gambrell, 814 P.2d 1136 (Ut.App. 1991); DeBry v. Valley Mortgage Co., 
835 P.2d 1000 (UtApp. 1992) 
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determination of an "accident" under an insurance policy, depends on the insured's point 
of view and the natural and foreseeable consequences from the insured's own actions. The 
U.S. District Court in Metric Const. Co., found that the insured proceeded with the 
installation of a defective roof, knowing that it would not be weather tight and doing 
nothing to rectify the problem. Therefore, the Court found that the water leaking from the 
roof, was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the insured's own actions, and not an 
accident under the terms of his insurance policy. 
The case of Home Sav. & Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 P.2d 341, 371 
n. 7, is not relevant to the facts in this case. The issue being addressed in footnote 7, was 
whether the loss was discovered within the effective period of Aetna's bond. In this case, 
there is no question but that the insurance policy was in effect at the time of the fire. 
Finally, the case of Horrell v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 909 P.2d 1279 
(Ut.App. 1996), cited by the Defendant, actually supports Plaintiffs position. In Horrell 
the insured's claim was denied based on arson and misrepresentation, similar to the 
Plaintiffs claims in this case. The Utah Court of Appeals in Horrell did not require the 
insured to prove the fire was "accidental" through the testimony of a cause and origin 
expert; but rather stated, that the burden of proving arson was on the insurance company, 
and not the insured. Id. at 1281. 
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V. EXPERT TESTIMONY IS NOT REQUIRED TO RAISE AN 
ISSUE OF FACT REGARDING THE CAUSE OF A FIRE. 
The trial court granted the Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict stating 
that the Plaintiff by reserving her cause and origin expert for rebuttal, failed to put on any 
evidence to show the fire was accidental. (Rec. 1210) As set forth above, the 
determination as to whether a fire is "accidental" as defined under an insurance policy, is 
based on the insured's point of view and whether the fire was foreseeable as a natural and 
probable result of the insured's own actions. Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 
669 P.2d 410 (Utah 1983). 
Regardless, when the cause and origin of a fire is at issue, the Utah Court of 
Appeals has already held that expert testimony is not required to put on evidence to raise 
a question of fact for a jury to decide whether the cause of a fire was accidental. The 
Plaintiff cites two cases directly on point in her opening brief, which the Defendant fails 
to address. Bear River Mutual Ins. Co. v. Williams, 2006 P.3d (2006 Ut. App. 500); and 
Neely v. Bennett, 51 P.3d 724 (Ut.App. 2002). 
In Bear River Mutual Ins. Co., the insured was not required to present any 
evidence by expert testimony to raise issues of fact for the jury to decide the cause of a 
fire, thus precluding summary judgment. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals in Bear 
River Mutual Inc. Co., held that even if the insurance company puts on expert testimony 
that a fire was intentional; the insured is still not required put on expert testimony that the 
fire was accidental, to raise any issue of fact for the jury. Id. 
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In Neely v. Bennett, the Court of Appeals specifically ruled that the failure 
to use expert testimony regarding the cause of a fire, does not establish causation as a 
matter of law, so as to allow a directed verdict against a party. Furthermore, the Court of 
Appeals stated that in determining the cause of a fire, a jury may elect to give no weight 
at all to an expert's opinion. Id. citing Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591, 597 (Utah 1982). 
Therefore, the Plaintiff in this case, contrary to the trial court's ruling, was 
not required to put on expert testimony that the fire was "accidental" either to present a 
prima facie case of liability under the insurance policy; or to raise an issue of fact as to 
the cause of the fire on the claim of arson. Id. 
The Defendant has failed to cite any cases where expert testimony was 
required for an insured to establish a prima facie case that a fire was "accidental" under 
an insurance policy. The case of Walker v. Parrish Chemical Co., 914 P.2d 1157 
(Ut.App.1996) does not support this position. In fact, Walker v. Parrish Chemical did not 
involve the question of whether the fire was accidental under an insurance policy, but the 
plaintiffs attempt to establish negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The 
Plaintiff in this case is not attempting to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur or 
establish the negligence of any party under tort law. Plaintiffs claim is contractual. 
Plaintiff had a policy of insurance with the Defendant, who promised to pay for damages 
caused by accidental means. If the Plaintiff was required to establish the negligence of 
the party committing the fire before she could recover under her insurance policy this 
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could have been written into the policy.13 
Furthermore, the case of Walker v. Parrish Chemical supports Plaintiffs 
position that expert testimony as to the cause of a fire is not required. The Court in 
Walker states that it is a matter of common knowledge that fires of unknown origin often 
occur. Professors Prosser and Keaton explain: 
[T]here are many accidents which as a matter of common knowledge, 
occur frequently.... A tumble downstairs, a fall in alighting from a standing bus or 
street car, an ordinary slip and fall, a tire of an ordinary automobile which blows out, a 
skidding car, a staph infection from an operation, or afire of unknown origin. Id. 
Therefore, according to the Utah Court of Appeals in Walker v. Parrish 
Chemical, as well as Professors Prosser and Keaton, a fire of unknown origin is a matter 
of common knowledge. 
The case of King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals Inc., 832 P.2d 858 (Utah 1992) 
is even more distinguishable. It is also a res ipsa loquitur attempt to establish 
negligence, but in the medical field. The plaintiff in King v. Searle was attempting to 
establish negligence and the medical causation of her injuries from the implementation of 
a intrauterine device (IUD). The court found that her claimed medical injuries and the 
medical standard of care, were beyond the common knowledge of the jury, so she could 
13It should be remembered that insurance policies are contracts of adhesion and 
should be given their broadest interpretation to extend coverage to the insured and fulfill 
its intended purpose. The requirement that in order to recover under an insurance policy, 
the insured must first prove the negligence of the person responsible, is contrary to the 
reason most people purchase insurance; and there would be no purpose for insurance, 
since recovery would first have to be sought against the negligent party responsible. 
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not rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The pharmaceutical company's liability 
could not be deduced from common experience and knowledge. However, this case does 
not involve a medical claim, medical causation, or the medical standard of care, requiring 
expert testimony. Furthermore, even in medical malpractice claims expert testimony is 
not always required.14 
The case of Preston v. Chambers, P.C v. Roller, 943 P.2d 260 (Ut.App. 
1997) is also distinguishable from this case, as it does not involve the question as to 
whether a fire is accidental under an insurance policy, but is a legal malpractice case. 
Therefore, expert testimony was necessary in Preston v. Chambers to establish the 
professional standard of care in the legal profession. There is no professional standard of 
care at issue in this case, requiring expert testimony. 
VI. PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WAS PROPERLY DESIGNATED 
AND SCHEDULED AS AN EXPERT WITNESS ON 
PLAINTIFF'S CASE. 
The Insurance Company claims that since Mr. King was to be used in 
rebuttal of the testimony of the fire marshal and Defendant's fire expert that the Plaintiff 
should be precluded from calling him as part of her case-in-chief, because it would be 
prejudicial to the Defendant. 
However, Mr. King was properly designated as an expert witness for 
Plaintiffs case in chief. (See Plaintiffs Designation of Expert Witnesses, Rec. 58-59). 
14In Searle Pharmaceuticals, supra, the Court stated that medical claims could 
proceed without expert testimony when the treatment received is within the common 
knowledge of the laymen, such as when an instrument is left inside a patient. 
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Furthermore, Mr. King's expert report was filed with the court and properly served on 
Defendant's counsel (Rec. 63-73), indicating that all accidental causes of the fire were not 
properly eliminated and the collapsed springs were a "classic indicator of a mattress fire." 
(Rec. 68). It was after receiving Mr. King's report that Defendant designated its expert 
witnesses. (Rec. 140). After receiving Mr. King's report and obtaining its own experts, 
Defendant took Mr. King's deposition and had the opportunity to question him regarding 
his report. (Rec. 166-167). Mr. King was designated as a witness on Plaintiffs case-in-
chief. There was no prejudice to the Defendant in allowing Mr. King to testify on 
Plaintiffs case-in-chief.15 
The Defendant argues that Plaintiff indicated that Mr. King was going to be 
called as a rebuttal witness. This may be true, but Mr. King was also going to be called on 
Plaintiffs case-in-chief. The fact Mr. King was also going to be used in rebuttal to the 
Insurance Company's claim of arson; does not preclude him from also testifying on 
Plaintiffs case-in-chief. Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329, 1338 (Utah 1993). He should 
have been permitted to testify before the ruling on directed verdict, especially when he 
was properly designated as an expert witness on Plaintiffs case-in-chief.16 
15Defendant's real concern was that its expert, Mr. Freeman, would not be 
available to testify until Friday; and the court made it clear on Wednesday, that 
regardless, the case was going to finish on Thursday. (Rec. 1305, p. 252). 
16Even if he were only designated as a rebuttal witness (which he wasn't); the 
Defendant elected to proceed and presented expert testimony to the jury through Richard 
Lyman that the fire was intentional; therefore, Mr. King still had the right to testify in 
rebuttal to Mr. Lyman's testimony. Astill v. Clark, 956 P.2d 1081 (Ut.App. 1998). 
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Moreover, both the Defendant and the trial court knew that Plaintiff 
intended to call Mr. King before the close of Plaintiff s evidence. At the end of Mr. 
Johnson's testimony, the court asked Plaintiff, subject to your last witness (being Mr. 
King) do you rest? (Rec. 1305, p. 183). It was known that Mr. King was going to testify 
before Plaintiff rested her case. Furthermore, asked if she rested, Plaintiffs counsel 
informed the court that she still intended to call Mr. King before resting her case. (Rec. 
1305, p. 252-253). In addition, the court told the Plaintiff and her counsel, that she would 
be able to call Mr. King on her case-in-chief at noon on Thursday, November 30th. (Rec. 
1305, p. 252-253). Plaintiff relied on this and had Mr. King ready to testify Thursday 
morning before noon. The trial court abused its discretion and greatly prejudiced the 
Plaintiff by not allowing her to call her expert to testify and close the evidence on her 
case, before ruling on the Motion for Directed Verdict.17 
VII. THERE WAS EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE JURY 
TO WITHSTAND A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
On a motion for directed verdict the moving party has the very difficult 
burden of showing that the party with the burden of proof has failed to raise any questions 
of material fact, and the court should deny the motion, when any evidence exists raising 
such a question, "no matter how improbable the evidence may appear." Alta Health 
Strategies, Inc., v. CCIMechanical Serv., 930 P.2d 284 (Ut.App. 1996)(emphasis added). 
17The expert report of Mr. King was filed with the court and is part of the record. 
He would have testified that not all accidental sources of the fire were properly eliminated 
and it appeared to be a classic mattress fire. (Rec. 63-73). 
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On a motion for directed verdict the court is not to weigh the evidence or 
determine its probability, but it is only to determine if some evidence exists to create a 
material issue of fact. The trial court in its ruling on directed verdict did not address all 
the evidence that was presented to the jury by the Plaintiff, her witnesses, the cross-
examination of the Defendant's witnesses, or the documents that were admitted into 
evidence by stipulation.18 (Rec. 1150-1151). 
For instance, the Plaintiff testified that she was not involved in the cause or 
the fire. She did not set it, arrange for it, or know that it was going to happen. It came as 
a complete surprise. (Rec. 1304, p. 35-36). Tim and his friend Brandon, where in the 
home that night and early morning, without Plaintiffs knowledge or permission, drinking 
alcohol, lighting candles, smoking on the mattresses, and playing video games, and 
watching TV, on appliances that were placed in the middle of the room on a pine table. 
(Rec. 1305, p.137; 150-151); and they were there with Chad Smith, who drove over in a 
goldish looking Ford Ranger, similar to Doug Young's. (Rec. 1305, p. 155). Electrician 
Chris Johnson testified that after the fire he observed burned wires in an electrical outlet, 
contrary to the pictures and reports prepared by Lyman and Blundell (Rec. 1305, p. 182). 
Mr. Lyman, the Sandy Fire Marshall, testified that his report was not complete, and that 
he never talked to the boys, that were there at the house that night, although new 
information would change his opinion on the cause of the fire. (Rec. 1305, p. 232). He 
18A11 evidence presented to the jury is to be considered on a motion for directed 
verdict. State v. Stockton, 310 P.2d 398 (Utah 1957). 
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also testified that the sagging mattress springs indicated a lot of heat and that this could 
have been a cause of the fire. (Rec. 1305, p. 224). Mr. Lyman indicated that there was no 
legitimate source of ignition in the middle of the room, where he believed the fire started, 
but yet identified some debris in the middle of the room the dog hit on, that he first 
thought was an auto part, then a computer part, or possibly a television part. (Rec. 1305, 
p. 225-228). Mr. Nelson, the dog handler, testified that the dog hit on some debirs in the 
northeast part of the room and they had to dig down to reach the debris.(Rec.l305, p.247). 
The lab report from Barker & Herbert indicates that the turpentine residue is naturally 
found in coniferous wood (such as pine) and can contaminate nearby objects when 
coniferous wood is burned. (Rec. 355). 
The trial court makes no indication that it even considered such evidence as 
to whether an issue of fact was presented, but simply states that Plaintiff failed to put on 
evidence that the fire was accidental, by reserving her cause and origin expert for rebuttal. 
Given all the evidence presented in this case regarding the cause of the fire, 
as set forth above, and in Plaintiffs Statement of the Facts in her brief; numerous factual 
questions were presented to the jury, precluding a directed verdict. 
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE 
PURSUANT TO RULE 41(b) WHICH DOES NOT APPLY 
TO JURY TRIALS, BUT TO BENCH TRIALS. 
The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs case in the middle of a jury trial, relying 
on Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Rec 1201). Rule 41(b) applies only 
to bench trials, not jury trials. Rule 41(b) should not be used injury trials and should not 
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be confused with a motion for directed verdict. Grossen v. DeWitt, 982 P.2d 581 
(Ut.App. 1999). Under Rule 41(b) the trial court may not usurp the jury's fact-finding 
role. Id. 
The court did not just erroneously refer to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure by stating that expert testimony was needed to prove the fire was 
accidental, without considering the other evidence presented to the jury. It is evident 
from this statement that the court was weighing the evidence and applying Rule 41(b) 
which gives the court greater discretion in considering the evidence19. As the trial court 
did in this case, under Rule 41(b), the court may dismiss a trial without a jury, if "(1) the 
claimant has failed to introduce evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case or (2) 
the trial court is not persuaded by that evidence." Walker v. Union Pac. R.R, 844 P.2d 
335, 338 n. 1 (Ut.App. 1993) (emphasis added). The trial court improperly dismissed the 
jury trial in this case, using a Rule 41(b) standard. Aha Health Strategies, Inc. v. CCI 
Mechanical Service, 930 P.2d 280, 284 (Ut.App. 1997). 
CONCLUSION 
The question as to whether the fire was "accidental" under the insurance 
policy in this case, is not dependent on an expert testifying as to the cause or origin of the 
fire; but rather, whether from the Plaintiffs point of view, the fire was foreseeable as the 
natural and probable result of the Plaintiffs own actions . Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. of 
19It is the substance of a motion that is dispositive in determining the character of 
the motion. Adoption of Baby K, 967 P.2d 947, 948 n. 1 (Ut.App. 1998). 
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North America, 669 P.2d 410 (Utah 1983); Fire Insurance Exchange v. Rosenberg, 930 
P.2d 1202, 1206 (Ut.App. 1997). Therefore, expert testimony was not needed for the 
Plaintiff to present evidence that the fire was "accidental" under the insurance policy. 
Furthermore, even when the cause and origin of a fire is at issue in a case, 
expert testimony is still not required to raise an issue of fact for the jury to determine 
whether the cause of a fire was accidental. Bear River Mutual Ins. Co. v. Williams, 2006 
P.3d (2006 Ut. App. 500); and Neely v. Bennett, 51 P.3d 724 (Ut.App. 2002). The 
Plaintiff did establish a prima facie case against the Insurance Company in this case 
without the need of expert testimony; and did present evidence to raise an issue of fact for 
the jury, precluding a directed verdict. 
Moreover, the trial court abused its discretion when it ruled on Defendant's 
Motion for Directed Verdict without allowing Plaintiffs expert to testify, when he was 
properly designated as an expert for Plaintiffs case-in-chief, when Plaintiff had indicated 
that she intended to call him before resting her case, and when the court earlier agreed to 
allow Mr. King to testify the next day, before the close of Plaintiff s evidence. 
Finally, the trial court improperly dismissed the jury trial by applying Rule 
41(b), in weighing the evidence and determining that is was insufficient without expert 
testimony, to present any evidence to the jury that the fire was accidental. 
The trial court's ruling on partial summary judgment and the Directed 
Verdict should both be set aside; and the case remanded back for a trial on these issues. 
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DATED this Z2^ day of October, 2007. 
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